The current debate over the now renamed “Campus Codes Committee” is a replay from Cornell’s 1969 crisis. Who has the final say in what is a fair judicial system or conduct code: the President or the community? Further, Day Hall is simultaneously trying to get the shared governance bodies to work together and yet stay in separate silos.
The 1969 debate over Cornell’s Judicial System
In 1969, Cornell was in a crisis centered around its judicial system and the extent to which the black students involved in a series of vandalism, violence, and disruptions should be held accountable. At the time, control of the campus judicial system was vested in the University Faculty, the set of all professors who met in a large group that could fill Bailey Hall.
In turn, the University Faculty delegated the topic to the Faculty Committee on Student Affairs (which included two student members) as well as a hearing board. The hearing board voted to reprimand the accused students, and the next day the Afro-American Society took over Willard Straight Hall in protest and refused to leave until the Administration promised to ask the faculty to overturn the convictions.
Prof. Robert D. Miller, who was Dean of the Faculty, called a full University Faculty meeting and recommended such a vote. The faculty met and refused to overturn the hearing board’s decision. In response, Miller resigned as Dean and eight thousand students, faculty, and staff gathered in Barton Hall to debate next steps. Eventually, the University Faculty relented, and a series of shared governance bodies evolved on campus.
Most observers came away from 1969 with two lessons: 1) Student accountability for misconduct should not be resolved through a political process and 2) The faculty had no business shaping judicial codes and procedures to the exclusion of students or staff.
Five years later, Miller wrote a retrospective article for the Sun. Miller wrote:
“Peaceful coexistence and constructive cooperation between senate and faculty, when cooperation is needed, would be fostered by reexamining their respective charters and sharpening the division of authority.”
For Miller, the key to success was painting clear lines between faculty-exclusive concerns and campus-wide issues to be decided by students-faculty-and-staff collectively.
Up until 1977, there were only two governance groups – the Faculty Council of Representatives and the student-faculty-staff University Senate. The Senate had the power to place items (such as the Phys. Ed. requirement) on the Faculty agenda, as well as make binding decisions on campus life issues.
In 1981, the student-faculty-employee body was split up into separate groups, and coordination problems and confusion multiplied. In 1993, the student group was further divided into a Student Assembly (SA) and a Graduate and Professional Student Assembly. Of course, as the number of groups increased, their ability to hold Day Hall accountable declined.
Jurisdictional Confusion Under Today’s Shared Governance Model
In recent years, Cornell’s shared governance has taken an odd path, trying to find consensus between all five governing bodies on issues that don’t necessarily concern each one—the SA, Graduate and Professional Student Assembly, Faculty Senate, Employee Assembly (EA), and the University Assembly (UA).
This attempt at universal approval results in the Faculty Senate taking up recent resolutions that are completely outside its jurisdiction or expertise, such as divestment from fossil fuels, hiring a full time Gynecologist, building a new swimming pool, or, in the near future, installing vending machines that sell Plan B and other non-prescription drugs. It also results in the Employee Assembly taking up student-specific issues. Of course, there is already a body established where students, faculty and staff work together – the University Assembly.
In addition, any of the shared governance groups can, by a two-thirds vote, pass a resolution disapproving of a resolution passed by some other group, and then the first group must address the objection. While direct conversations would be a cleaner process, the “get-all-assemblies-to-adopt-the-same resolution” path inhibits other assemblies from refining or even slightly modifying any resolution for fear of obstructing progress.
Cornell finds itself in this mess because of the recent debate over divesting from fossil fuel stocks. Unlike most topics, only the Trustees have the authority to decide investment/divestment policies. In 2015, the UA recommended fossil fuel divestment to the trustees. Acting President David Skorton rejected the recommendation, but offered a “green option” as an alternative to donors. The UA Chair responded that, since the UA addressed its recommendation to the Board, the Board should respond.
Skorton replied, “President-elect Elizabeth Garrett and the Board of Trustees’ Chair Robert Harrison and Investment Committee Chair Donald Opatrny reviewed and approved my response to UA Resolution 6 in advance of its submission to the Assembly.” As a former Student Trustee and former Speaker of the University Senate, Trustee Chair Robert Harrison would be aware of shared governance structures and when and how shared governance groups could bypass the President to reach the Board.
By 2016, all five groups recommended that the Trustees divest from fossil fuels. In January 2016, the Board formally adopted a divestment policy that such proposals would be heard on the Board’s agenda over the President’s objection only if all five shared governance bodies voted to support such a move. It is almost as if that threshold was chosen because it is virtually impossible to get all five to agree on anything.
Prior to the divestment controversy, the charter of each of the five bodies allowed recommendations to the President, and, if necessary, each (except for the EA) can also make recommendations to the Trustees. (Despite the new Trustee policy, the EA charter only allows it to recommend to the President and limits its topics to “policies that affect the staff community.”) By setting up this extra 5-body hurdle, the President and the Trustees could choose to duck taking a stand on an issue because the other four bodies had not yet considered it.
The benefit of the consensus policy is that it encourages students, faculty, and staff to discuss the same policy issues in an effort to build consensus. The detriment is that it transformed shared governance resolutions from being well-researched, expertly-made policy recommendations to rubber stamps for the political cause de jour, often outside the bodies’ areas of competence.
Debating the Merits with Administrators
The charters of the five groups presupposes interaction with individual Cornell offices, including the right to ask for data and to form committees that will maintain a close and continuing relationship with those offices.
The governance model assumed the community and administrators would work together to resolve problems rather than just passing resolutions demanding that the Trustees override the priorities of the President and Day Hall.
The charters assumed that most issues and resolutions would be decided on their merits, with each assembly free to refine as necessary. Instead, we see a lock-step push to ram the same resolution through all five bodies
Campus Codes
The recent turf battles over the Campus Code of Conduct and Judicial System highlight this problem. Since students, faculty, and staff were all subject to the Campus Code and to Policy 6.4, it makes sense for the University Assembly (with representatives from all three groups) to have jurisdiction over such matters. With sole jurisdiction over codes of conduct, it would also stand to reason that the UA have a dedicated committee to administer the code– the Codes and Judicial Committee (CJC). Faculty and students (particularly law students) have become deeply involved with the CJC on these issues for decades.
Suddenly, in 2020, the undergraduates in the Student Assembly decided that they should call the shots to the exclusion of concerned faculty, staff, and graduate and professional students. Separate from the UA and the CJC, the university counsel’s office ghost wrote a draft student code and procedures to replace the existing Campus Code of Conduct and procedures. The “Office of Student Advocate” then presented the draft to the SA Executive Committee as its own “student-written” proposal on April 21, 2020. The new student code, rather than one developed for 18 months by the CJC, was adopted by the full SA just two days later.
Although the University Assembly’s charter gave it final say over such matters, in December 2020, the Trustees removed those powers by adopting a version of the Student Code and Procedures that excluded the UA from any role in further amendments.
However, the Trustees did not also amend the UA charter. The UA’s charter still gives it the power to “examine, on its own initiative, matters which involve the interests or concern the welfare of a substantial segment of the campus community [including] common standards of conduct….”
The UA tried to clean up matters with a resolution, but President Pollack wrote on April 18, 2022, that the UA now errantly claims:
“…authority over areas that have not been delegated to it, including acting as a ‘non-judicial, non-administrative body authorized to receive and consider complaints’ on a wide range of matters, including ‘the application of Cornell’s codes or regulations of conduct,’ matters of freedom of speech, and collective bargaining issues. Oversight of these areas is appropriately handled by various administrative units of the university, and the UA cannot assume review authority over them.”
In effect, President Pollack said that the UA cannot weigh in with recommendations in areas that the SA or GPSA can recommend. Yet, all five now can (and sometimes must) weigh in on any subject for the purpose of getting the Trustees to discuss a proposal. This makes no sense. How can the University Assembly’s judgment on an issue be both a breach of jurisdiction and necessary for recommendation of said issue to the board of Trustees?
The President’s quote above argues that since “various administrative units” have the ability to handle an issue, the University Assembly does not have jurisdiction in the matter. This also makes no sense. The University Assembly exists precisely to advise and check these administrative units.
Meanwhile, Cornell continues to be subject to decades-worth of lawsuits from students, faculty and staff who contest unfair treatment under Cornell’s internal hearing processes, particularly the Title IX Policy 6.4 process. Cornell faces a revolving door of Title IX Coordinators as a result.
It appears that the CJC and President Pollack have resolved their differences. The true test will be when some judicial controversy erupts and finger pointing between the shared governance bodies and Day Hall takes center stage. Cornell cannot truthfully claim that its conduct system now operates with the consent of the governed.
