No word is more synonymous with China’s conduct in the Pacific than expansionism. The communist state owes this sinister disrepute to many egregious acts; gorging countries with duplicitous investment schemes and bullying neighbours are just the tip of the iceberg that is Beijing’s political agenda. Despite these controversies, China is marching on. In 2019, the governments of the Solomon Islands and Kiribati undertook a drastic foreign policy volte-face, shifting diplomatic allegiance from the democratic Taipei to the authoritarian Beijing. Other nations are also considering cooperating with China. Albeit alarming, few dare to oppose conversion to Pax Sinica, Palau and Papua New Guinea representing the two notable exceptions.
The US and Australia have plenty to lose from the region’s usurpation by China. For Canberra, it risks stymying any attempts at an independent foreign policy, since China already wields economic influence over the local markets and hardly shuns from exploiting this. The Communist Party’s most recent sabre-rattling involved suspending meat imports from major abattoirs and placing barley tariffs to admonish the Australian government’s calls for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19. For Washington, giving way to such encroachments will undermine Trump’s China policy at a time, when the US economy has been crippled by the coronavirus outbreak and the depreciation of oil prices.
As one hand up its sleeve is weakened, the White House must look for new leverage mechanisms against the East Asian superpower and reverse its traditional neglect of the island states in tow with Australia. Certainly, committing to this fray is no silver bullet to the issue of Chinese expansionism, but it is better to enter the scramble for the region than to withdraw without mounting any resistance to this strategic rival. As one 60 Minutes Australia investigation has concluded, more often than not, those nations turn to Beijing only because the West has chosen not to compete in the first place.
In truth, neither powers have overlooked the Pacific completely up to this point. Though Australia’s aid budget has consistently been shrinking since 2013, its governing Coalition last year reallocated large portions of the funding to that part of the planet. USAID donated another $441 million and partnered with PNG to electrify 70% of the country by 2030. Furthermore, the two are contemplating establishing a naval base, which the BBC concatenates to reports that China was interested in developing a permanent military presence in Vanuatu. The US and Australia are finally awakening to the possibility of losing influence to an aspiring geopolitical monopolist and are taking measures to counterpoise China.
However commendable this retaliation is, there remains much catching up to do. China’s soft power strategy offers a stark contrast to those haphazard efforts. It forms part of a coherent blueprint to mold the area according to the desiderata of Xi Jinping’s coterie and is exemplified in its treatment of the Solomon Islands. There, Prime Minister Sogavare’s decision to recognise the Communist state immediately paved the path for deals with Chinese firms, making it resemble a dash for cash rather than a comprehensive move. His trip to Beijing saw him return with leases of mines to mainland businesses and promises to build infrastructure on the archipelago. One company even tried to exploit this climate to rent the whole island of Tulagi. As Deakin University’s Matthew Clarke purports, “being able to utilise ports for both commercial and presumably military purposes is important to” China’s ambitious plan to reorient global trade. Yet in a country where the majority of enterprises have ties to the state, such a plan a priori cannot be confined to purely economic concerns. Strong economic links did not spare Australia from the pressure to resile from its critical stance on aspects of China’s policies. As the same holds true for Palau, Beijing arguably treats economic and political objectives as inseparable.
In this regard, America’s oscitancy is just as ruinous as China’s actions: the US approaches the Pacific issues dilatorily and narrow-mindedly. In his book, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, Ron Crocombe elaborates on this reluctance to act. The US supplied no aid to the South Pacific until 1975, later tailoring its amount to what the USSR was giving before eventually reneging on its commitments altogether in 1990. China naturally filled this void, and whereas the West specialises in grant aid, China employs grants and low-interest loans to tie polities both diplomatically and economically. The existing conjuncture no doubt vindicates this system’s superiority in securing lasting attachment to the donor.
Furthermore, the heads of most postcolonial governments are ignored on the global stage, especially by American leaders. Neither Obama nor Trump, both of whom have sought to focus the domestic political discourse on China, registered a single visit to the islands. Contrastingly, Xi Jinping travels to the Pacific himself and invites its leaders to Beijing, ensuring his support stays visible. As early as in 2006, China chaired the inaugural China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum. According to Crocombe, this visibility entices local leaders who “gain political mileage at home from having their handshake with the US [or the Chinese] president shown on domestic television”. The latter’s sympathisers find easy access to high-profile officials, whence they are more popular electorally than those without such recognition. In turn, by helping its apologists obtain power, China may naturally count on greater gestures of goodwill.
Australia and the United States must ramp up their response. The Pacific nations are no longer the sunny places from holiday postcards, but important points on the map and failure to pay due heed to them can drive a wedge between the US and the region. After the pandemic, America will struggle to rely on the same tools as before and must reassess its containment arsenal, adopting a more inventive, auspicious strategy towards China. In the 20th century, the US was swift to spot the threat of Soviet expansionism in Europe and respond with the Marshall Plan. Something similar is needed today; to quote the Palauan President, “Just one investment can go a long way.”
Dan Mikhaylov is an Associate Writer for the Orthodox Conservatives, a UK student-run think tank dedicated to the promotion of socially conservative values on college campuses. His works, primarily concerned with international relations, have also regularly featured on the Globe Post and The Caerulean.
